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being of the latter is eternal, so may be the being of the former. A consciousness of this kind must, however, be supposed to live in its creations, and would thus participate in the time order that belongs to them. We must think of the process, it would seem, as the continuous unfolding of a plan that has eternal significance and beauty, and that leads up to a definite end. The end would presumably consist in the full apprehension of the significance and beauty of the whole. The reaching of the end, it would seem, would imply a return to the beginning. The wheel would have come full circle. The order of before and after would be completed, and the completion would consist in the whole being apprehended as present. It would be at once the end and the beginning of the unfolding order, which in itself would be eternal" (p. 451). This we may round off by a further suggestion: "It might perhaps be conjectured that there is always some spirit occupying the attitude of contemplation of the perfect whole, from which it then descends to take part in the downward and upward path. The abiding One would thus be an attitude or point of view rather than a person; and it would appear that we ought to assume that this attitude could in the end be reached by every real spirit" (p. 438). Here we are unmistakably passing from the realm of well-grounded theory to the gropings of Platonic myth. Still, it is not merely idle to think of human life as "the partial manifestation of the life of an eternal spirit—or perhaps rather of a number of such spirits—having its significance in the gradual attainment of an attitude from which the perfection of the whole can be apprehended and appreciated" (p. 445). I fear there will be little rejoicing in the Neo-Realistic heaven, for the repentance of this Idealistic sinner is clearly only skin-deep.

R. F. ALFRED HOERNLÉ.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

Moral Values, A Study of the Principles of Conduct. By WALTER GOODNOW EVERETT. New York, Henry Holt, 1918.—pp. xiii, 439.

In *Moral Values* Professor Everett has given us what seems to the reviewer the best text-book on ethics that has yet appeared. It is written with great clearness. And this is well, for no text-book in this field, produced in our generation, has reached an eminence which justifies the expenditure of the labor of a body of commentators. In choice of subject matter and manner of treatment it is likely to raise and hold the interest alike of the undergraduate and the general reader. The style is attractive, and many things are exceedingly well said. The author is catholic in spirit and at the same time is very

far removed from being a syncretist. He has sought to embody in his own theory the contributions of different schools of thought, and has succeeded admirably, in the main, in this difficult task. He has shown a sound estimate of the place of historical references in an introductory treatise. Experience seems to demonstrate that the history of ethical thought means little to those who have never faced the problems of ethics through a systematic study of the concrete facts of the moral life itself. The historical material in many textbooks probably has little more value in the end than does a list of the kings of England, which some of us were condemned to learn in our youth. Professor Everett has devoted two chapters of his book to the history of the controversy between hedonism and perfectionism. Apart from this he keeps the attention turned upon the moral experience itself, rather than upon *résumés* of what this, that, or the other writer has chosen to say about it.

Professor Everett's position one would like to characterize as universalistic hedonism of the type of Hume. This, I think, is in essence what it is. But Professor Everett himself would vigorously protest against any such classification. Morality, he says, is a matter of values; and value has two sides which may be called, for want of a better nomenclature, the subjective and the objective. On the subjective side value is pleasure. But the author insists, pleasure is a mere abstraction; it is always found in connection with some content, "the objects or activities in connection with which the feelings arise." "Only if disembodied states of feeling could wander at large quite independent of all other mental content" could value be described solely in terms of pleasure. The whole experience is the thing that is valuable.

In a certain sense all this is undoubtedly true. In this sense no hedonist, as far as I can see, has ever had the slightest idea of denying it. Similarly the color red never appears alone. It is always part of red objects of various shapes, sizes, textures, etc. Nevertheless, if redness supplied the content of value, it would be perfectly intelligible to say that red as such is the good, the other elements of the red object being, from this point of view, indifferent. I think Professor Everett may have failed to see this fact because of one of the greatest excellences of his book. Various more or less plausible objections may be urged against hedonism, but the deadliest is that even if true it is of no great use in practice. The main lines of action are determined, as the author points out, by other methods than the use of the hedonistic calculus, strictly so called. Our ordinary procedure in everyday life,

he writes, is essentially the following. "We allow ourselves to follow the impulse to new activities, provided they do not conflict with already established purposes. The completed whole is achieved by excluding contradictory and discordant elements as we move forward in the direction of the largest meaning which, from day to day, we are able to discern." That these impulses must not be accepted in the uncritical way demanded by the so called 'voluntaristic' writers, is one of the most fundamental contentions of the book. On the other hand the information that only those impulses are worth adopting that promise some sort of pleasure, either in pursuit or attainment, gives us little help in the actual conduct of life. What the students in an ethics class want to know is what particular modes of activity are valuable, what concrete (or "objective") ends are worth pursuing. In a chapter which if it contained anything really new would probably be in so far false, Professor Everett gives the undergraduate the best discussion of this subject that he will be able to find in any text-book.

The relationship of a writer of the type of Professor Everett to his intellectual ancestors seems to me to be something more than a mere matter for the quarrels of pedants. As a matter of fact ninety out of every hundred teachers of ethics in the English-speaking world today are, in essentials, members of the school which began with Shaftesbury, and which counts Hutcheson, Hume, and Adam Smith among its most illustrious members. This statement holds for Green and his followers, who can not too much express their scorn and contempt for these "superficial thinkers," just as truly as it does for a man like Professor Westermarck. To call these founders of our modern faith intuitionists, as Professor Everett does, and to contrast their position with an empirical or "historical" view is hopelessly confusing. The moral judgment is the reaction of the personality to a suggested end or aim. According to ethical rationalism this reaction has its source in reason. According to Professor Everett, if I understand him, this reaction has its source in the sympathetic and aesthetic emotions. The latter view is that of Shaftesbury, the former of Hume. Both of these men undoubtedly left much to be said on this subject. It is for their descendants to fill up the lacunae. They both, especially Hume, said much which their followers have not taken the trouble to assimilate. The latter will be more likely to get what may be had for the asking if they are fully cognizant of their relationship to their intellectual ancestors. Some of the most unfortunate gaps and inadequacies in Professor Everett's account of the moral life—gaps and inadequacies which are such from the point of view of his own general

standpoint, are matters which were discussed and in essence settled by the eighteenth century members of the so called 'moral sense' school.

There are two categories of which ethical theory is bound to give an account, namely, the good and the right. Either the one or the other is ignored, as far as any systematic discussion is concerned, in a very considerable proportion of the works on ethics. The result, of course, is that the omitted category appears sooner or later without having been compelled to give an account of itself, and usually much the worse for the immunity. *Moral Values* differs from such books in that it gives an equable share of attention to the study of both terms. With regard alike to the good and the right two questions can be asked, and they form the fundamental problems of ethics: What things are good, and what right, and what is the meaning of the terms good and right? The latter problems are constantly ignored in standard works on ethics. Yet they are absolutely fundamental, and no theory can proceed more than a step without assuming some solution. According to Professor Everett those actions are right or moral in which, where a choice is necessary, the less inclusive interest is subordinated to the more inclusive interest, whether of self or another. But now the question is inevitable: What is the meaning of the word right in this statement? Some writers take up this problem under the form of the source of moral distinctions. Unfortunately this fundamental question is nowhere discussed in a systematic way under any form in *Moral Values*. The same is true of the category of the good. We are indeed told that good is not the equivalent of an attained desire. Is it then entirely unrelated to desire? Is it, for example, what Sidgwick makes it in the first five editions of the *Methods of Ethics*, an unanalyzable concept of reason? Or is it what he makes it in the sixth edition? Or is it something different from either? Logically, and to a considerable extent practically, no satisfactory answer can be given to the question, what elements of experience are good, until we know what we mean by good, or in other words, till we know what we are driving at. This statement applies equally to the term right. It is indeed possible to show roughly by induction what modes of conduct a given society regards as morally praiseworthy. But the further question (a question in which Professor Everett is greatly interested) whether in this welter of conflicting opinions anything whatever is ultimately right cannot be answered without a clean-cut conception of what is meant by the word right. Professor Everett succeeds in reaching his solution of the problem only by ignoring or brushing aside a large body of recalcitrant facts.

These limitations, though serious, are however the limitations, in a greater or less degree, of all the text-books; and they are balanced in *Moral Values* by manifold excellences. Some of the best treatments deal with the following subjects: The place of pleasure in the judgment of value, the actual process by which our concrete judgments of (objective) value are formed and the content of these judgments, the value of character as both instrumental and intrinsic and the relation between the two, the place of altruism in the moral life, and finally (notwithstanding its limitations) the universality and authority of the moral ideal.

FRANK CHAPMAN SHARP.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.

Platonism. By PAUL ELMER MORE. Princeton University Press, 1917.—pp. ix, 306.

Hitherto the author of *Platonism* has been known chiefly as the editor of the *Nation* and as a man of letters. In these lectures, delivered at Princeton University towards the close of 1917 under the provisions of the Louis Clark Vanuxem Foundation, he has given us the fruits of the scholar's patient labor in a more technical and less popular field. The matters discussed in the volume include nearly all of the traditional and more difficult problems of Platonism, with the exception of the chronology of the dialogues. The author's views of the logical (and to a certain extent the chronological) sequence of Plato's writings are summarized at the conclusion of the book, with here and there an interesting argument concerning the articulation of the writings in time or thought. The volume is occupied mainly with the relation of Socrates to Plato, the Platonic psychology, the doctrine of ideas, the cosmogony and metaphysics. Only incidental attention is paid to Plato's theory of the state or the mechanism of government or to his views of education as a system.

More approaches his subject from a fundamentally Graeco-Roman pragmatic point of view, the view of Socrates and the great ethical schools succeeding him, and to a large extent the view of Plato himself, that philosophy is an *ars vivendi*, a body of maxims, principles, and intuitions essential for the successful conduct of life. He has less interest in the purely scientific, metaphysical or theoretical aspect of thought. He defines philosophy as the "sincere and humble endeavor to make clear and precise to ourselves the fundamental facts of our conscious life. . . . Its method and its truth are summed up in the three Socratic theses—scepticism, spiritual affirmation, and the paradoxical identification of virtue and knowledge" (p. 232).